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ED COOPER, RULE 56, AND CHARLES E. CLARK'S
FOUNTAIN OF YOUTH
Steven S. Gensler*
Our happy occasion is to commemorate Ed Cooper's twenty
years of service on the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, one year as
a rank-and-file member and the following nineteen as its Reporter.
Note that I did not say we are here to pay tribute to Ed. That is not
because tribute would be undeserved. It takes less than the prover-
bial drop of a hat to get me to gush about Ed, his work on the
Advisory Committee, or his impact on me personally. The reason I
did not say we are here to pay tribute to Ed is that he, upon learn-
ing of the occasion, asked that the program focus on substance and
not him. Will I heed his request? Yes. And no. Though I feel honor
bound not to address my comments directly to Ed individually, the
next best thing is to address my comments to the institution he has
so expertly served. And taking a truly long-term institutional view, I
will do so from the perspective of Ed's earliest predecessor-the
first Reporter of the Advisory Committee-Charles E. Clark.'
Nobody had a greater impact on the formulation of the original
Civil Rules than Clark. His role as both the principal architect2 and
the principal draftsman 3 of the Civil Rules is well known. As Profes-
sor Wright once put it, although the Civil Rules were a joint effort,
* Welcome D. & W. DeVier Pierson Professor, Associate Dean for Research &
Scholarship, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. I will dispense with a complete biography and recite only the most basic and relevant
details. Clark joined the faculty at the Yale Law School in 1919. See Biographical Directory of
Federal Judges: Charles Edward Clark, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?
jid=439&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Aug. 31, 2012). He was named Dean of
the Yale Law School in 1929. See id. In 1935, the United States Supreme Court appointed
Clark as a member of the original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, also designating him as
the Reporter. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 18 (1988). In 1939, Clark left Yale
to become a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a position
he held until his death in 1963. See FED. JUDICIAL CmR., supra.
2. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 961-73 (1987) (describing the influ-
ence of Clark's philosophy on the content of the Civil Rules) [hereinafter Subrin, How Equity
Conquered]; see also Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 98-103 (1989)
(discussing Clark's philosophy and its influence on the adoption of liberal joinder rules);
David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law
Reform, 44 GA. L. REv. 433, 493-505 (2010) (discussing the influence of Clark's philosophy
on the rules generally).
3. See Fred Rodell, For Charles E. Clark: A Brief and Belated but Fond Farewell 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 1323, 1323 (1965) (calling Clark the "prime instigator and architect of the rules of
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"the end product bears the unmistakable Clark stamp."4 But Clark
started shaping the Civil Rules even before drafting began.5 Ini-
tially, ChiefJustice Hughes thought the civil rules project should be
limited to creating rules for actions at law (leaving in place-and
separate-the existing equity rules). 6 A passionate advocate for
merging law and equity procedure, Clark mounted a multi-front
campaign to get the Court to change its course.7 His campaign suc-
ceeded." Clark also succeeded in persuading the Court to adopt a
centralized drafting process, with the work to be done by a select
group of experts, many of whom Clark himself recommended. 9 Fi-
nally, Clark maneuvered to be named Reporter,10 a position that no
doubt contributed to the Civil Rules bearing his stamp.
In this Essay, however, I want to focus not on the events that led
up to the 1938 rules but on what happened after they took effect.
Was the work of the Advisory Committee done? Did the Advisory
Committee even exist anymore? If so, what was the Committee's
assignment? It should come as no surprise that, just as Clark had
strong views about the initial drafting of the rules, he also had
federal civil procedure"); Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 915 (1976) (stating that Clark "was principally responsible for the
drafting of the Federal Rules"); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 486 (1993) (calling the Clark the "principal drafts-
man" of the 1938 rules); Weinstein, supra note 1, at 18 (calling Clark the "moving force"
behind the Advisory Committee).
4. Charles A. Wright & Harry M. Reasoner, Introduction to PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID
OF JUSTICE: Ess.ys OF JuncE CHAMP~s E. CLARK 3 (Charles A. Wright & Harry M. Reasoner
eds., 1965).
5. According to Professor Stephen Subrin, "Clark's most meaningful contribution to
procedural reform was not the actual drafting of most of the 1938 Federal Rules, but his
influence on the development of modern civil procedure during the first six months of 1935,
before the drafting began." Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The
Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, inJUDGE CHARLEs E. CLARK 115, 116 (Peninah Pe-
truck ed., 1991) [hereinafter Subrin, Clark's Procedural Outlook].
6. See id. at 118.
7. Id. at 119-30.
8. See Charles Evan Hughes, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Address at An-
nual Meeting of American Law Institute (May 9, 1935), in 21 A.B.A.J. 340, 342 (1935).
9. See Subrin, Clark's Procedural Outlook, supra note 5, at 131.
10. SeeStephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1136
n.539 (1982) ("Clark ensured that he and not Sunderland would be selected as Reporter by
bringing the latter's views [on the issue of uniformity versus conformity] to Mitchell's atten-
tion."); Peter Charles Hoffer, Text, Translation, Context, Conversation: Preliminary Notes for
Decoding the Deliberations of the Advisory Committee That Wrote the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 37
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 409, 434-35 (1993) (describing how Clark undermined Sunderland to
Mitchell but then made up for it by enlisting Sunderland to draft the discovery and summary-
judgment rules); Subrin, Clark's Procedural Outlook, supra note 5, at 132-38 (asserting that
Clark engaged in negative campaigning to ensure that he, and not Edson Sunderland, would
be named Reporter).
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strong views about how they should be superintended. Clark lob-
bied for the creation of a standing Advisory Committee, and he
wrote extensively about what the work of the Committee should be.
In one capacity or another, Clark continued to toil in the rulemak-
ing fields for another twenty-four years until his death in 1963.11
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I looks back at the devel-
opment of the institution of the standing Advisory Committee. It
tells two stories. First, it provides a quick history of what the Advi-
sory Committee did after 1938 and how it came to be in its current
form. Second, it sets forth Clark's very influential views about what
role a standing Advisory Committee should play. Part II returns us
to modern times. It analyzes the most recent set of major amend-
ments to the Civil Rules-the 2010 amendments to Rule 56-to see
how that project relates to Clark's views on the continuing rulemak-
ing process. Part III concludes with a few reflections on Ed's role in
advancing some of the rulemaking values that Clark held so dear.
I. A FOUNTAIN OF YOUTH FOR THE CIVIL RULES
The rulemaking structure that gives us the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules as we know it recently celebrated its golden anniver-
sary, though the milestone was marked with little pomp and circum-
stance.' 2 After fifty years, I think most people today take the
Advisory Committee for granted. But in fact the standing Advisory
Committee as we have come to know it emerged at the end of a
twenty-five-year campaign. Charles E. Clark was one of the leading
figures in that campaign. He started calling for a standing Advisory
Committee even before the original Advisory Committee's work was
done.' 3 He wasn't looking for personal job security, but he was act-
ing out of a sort of self-interest. Clark had strong views about the
role of procedure and the proper design of a procedural scheme,
and a standing Advisory Committee would-if it followed his lead-
serve to institutionalize those views.
11. From 1939 to 1956, Clark continued as the Reporter for the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules, at least during those times when the Advisory Committee was constituted. See infra
notes 22-32 and accompanying text. In 1960, Clark was appointed to serve on the United
States Judicial Conference's newly constituted Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure. See 4 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1007, at 38 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing creation and composition of the original Stand-
ing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure).
12. By way of comparison, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rules themselves, at
least six major conferences marked the occasion. See Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938-1988, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1873 n.1 (1989).
13. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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This Part examines the development of the standing Advisory
Committee. It begins with a history detailing the evolution of the
Advisory Committee from 1938 to 1960. It then turns to the func-
tions that Clark envisioned for the standing Advisory Committee
that he advocated.
This Part also develops two principal themes. The first theme is
that Clark saw the standing Advisory Committee as a natural exten-
sion of his philosophy of procedure. He designed the rules to be
flexible, discretionary, and empowering rather than restrictive. A
critical role of the standing Advisory Committee would be to pre-
serve those characteristics by counteracting what Clark thought was
the inevitable tendency of procedure to harden over time. The sec-
ond theme is that, for Clark, the quality of a procedural rule was
measured by how well it was serving its intended function. Thus, a
second critical role of a standing advisory committee would be to
keep the rules vital and young, always serving their functions in
light of the needs of the day and always on the forefront of proce-
dural progress. In that respect, the standing Advisory Committee
would serve as a fountain of youth for the Civil Rules.
A. Twenty Years in the Making
I suspect that few people pause to consider the existence of a
standing advisory committee overseeing the Civil Rules. Now and
then, someone questions the wisdom of having a standing advisory
committee. One commentator is said to have remarked that creat-
ing a standing advisory committee was a mistake because it would
lead to constant "tinkering" with the rules. 14 Perhaps the concern is
that a standing advisory committee will make needless changes to
justify its continuing existence. 15 But most people, if they did pause
to ponder the subject, would probably shrug their shoulders and
proclaim the existence of a standing advisory committee to be fully
expected, very probably necessary, and perhaps even inevitable.
14. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59
BROOK. L. Rv. 761, 761 (1993).
15. I certainly did not find that to be the case during my years on the Advisory Commit-
tee. It is perhaps noteworthy that there were no changes to the Civil Rules in 2011 or 2012.
To me, that does not suggest a body taking actionjust for action's sake. Past participants have
expressed similar sentiments about the Advisory Committee taking action only when a real
need is shown. See, e.g., Charles A. Wright, Amendments to the Federal Rules: The Function of a
Continuing Rules Committee, 7 VAND. L. REv. 521, 523 (1954) ("Many suggestions were rejected,
not necessarily because they lacked merit but because the Committee was opposed to change
merely for the sake of change, and approved only those amendments for which there was a
showing of clear need.").
VOL. 46:2
WINTER 2013] Rule 56 and Charles Clark's Fountain of Youth
Someone has to at least watch over the Civil Rules. 16 And that someone
needs to be within (or attached to) the judicial branch, lest Con-
gress take the lack of judicial oversight as an invitation to involve
itself directly.17
But just as the Supreme Court wasn't in a position to personally
draft the original Civil Rules, it also can't personally watch over
them. Even my most wide-eyed of first-year students are beyond the
naivet6 required to think that the Supreme Court Justices could or
would block out the time to maintain a comprehensive and inde-
pendent study of the latest procedural developments in the lower
courts (let alone do the same thing for the Appellate Rules, the
Bankruptcy Rules, the Criminal Rules, and the Evidence Rules).18
Once you calculate the amount of work that job would entail and
then factor in the Court's limited resources, the idea of having a
"band of experts" keep the watch and make proposals to the Su-
preme Court seems like a natural solution.
When the Civil Rules took effect in September 1938, however,
the existence of a standing advisory committee was hardly a fore-
gone conclusion. The original Advisory Committee made no secret
of its belief that there should be a standing advisory committee. A
proposal to create a standing advisory committee was included in its
Preliminary Draft of the Rules, circulated for public comment in
16. As Professor James Win. Moore wisely noted a long time ago, there is a big differ-
ence between supporting the "continuous study" of the Rules and promoting their "continu-
ous change." See James Win. Moore, Address of Professor Moore, in The Rule-Making
Function and the Judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117, 128.
17. See Charles E. Clark, The Proper Function of the Supreme Court's Federal Rules Committee,
28 A.B.A. J. 521, 523 (1942) [hereinafter Clark, Proper Function] (discussing problematic de-
lays in amending rules under prior versions of the Rules Enabling Act's congressional submis-
sion requirement); Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REv.
435, 443 (1958) [hereinafter Clark, Two Decades] (labeling the fear of "legislative tinkering" a
"profound stimulus" in discussions to revive the Advisory Committee); see also James Win.
Moore, The Supreme Court: 1940, 1941 Terms-The Supreme Court and Judicial Administration, 28
VA. L. REv. 861, 906-07 (1942) ("Unless there is some committee to which they can refer
their suggestions and complaints, the only course left open is legislation; but if there is a
functioning committee on hand to invite and receive suggestions, then the great bulk of
lawyers will acquiesce in the Committee's final decision on changes in the Rules."). While this
Essay is not the place to rehearse the reasons for wanting to minimize legislative amendment
of the Rules, there is a general consensus that a legislative rulemaking model would be dys-
functional. See Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REv. 261, 288 (2009) ("[W]hile a legislative model of federal court
rulemaking has not been attempted, the general consensus is that such a body would be
dysfunctional."); see also Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A
Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 673, 673 (1975) ("The legislative process seems particu-
larly unsuited both to wholesale reform of court procedures and to technical adjustment of
specific regulations.").
18. See Clark, Two Decades, supra note 17, at 443 ("The Court is not equipped and should
not be expected to conduct extensive research on its own; this is a task to be performed for it
by others, leaving only broad decisions of policy to be ultimately settled by the Court.").
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1936.19 But the Rules Enabling Act made no mention of a standing
advisory committee. 20 Neither did the Supreme Court's Order ap-
pointing the original Advisory Committee.2 ' The first Advisory
Committee members had every reason to wonder whether their
work was done when they submitted their final report in November
1937. Ultimately, it would take twenty years before the Advisory
Committee scheme as we know it would come into existence.
The Supreme Court's first gesture toward developing a standing
advisory committee came very quickly when, in November 1939, it
issued an order asking the Advisory Committee members "to pre-
pare and submit to the Court such amendments as they may deem
advisable. ' 22 As written, however, the Order called only for a one-
time report; it said nothing about ongoing activity. Moreover, it
seems likely that the Court's motive in reappointing the Advisory
Committee was simply to stake an early claim that the Court-and
not Congress-would superintend the Rules going forward, without
making any commitment to how that process would work. After re-
ceiving the Order but before the Advisory Committee was to meet,
Chairman Mitchell wrote to Chief Justice Hughes suggesting that it
might be too soon for a review of the new rules. The Rules had only
been in effect for little more than a year, and no major problems
had developed. 23 Chairman Mitchell suggested that, rather than
start "tinkering" with the Rules, it might be better to wait until a
longer period of experience demonstrated a more compelling need
for changes. 24
In response, Chief Justice Hughes made it clear he wanted the
Advisory Committee to do something at that time to stave off any
19. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 170-71 (1936) (describing Rule A, a proposal for a
standing advisory committee on the rules of civil procedure).
20. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 41 (2d ed. 1947)
(noting that the Enabling Act of 1934 contained no express provisions for amendments).
21. The initial Order appointing the Advisory Committee stated that it would be the
duty of the Committee "to prepare and submit to the Court a draft of a unified system of
rules." Order Appointing Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295
U.S. 774, 775 (1935). That appointment Order made no comment about whether the Advi-
sory Committee would continue to serve in any capacity after submitting its draft. See id. at
774-75.
22. Order, 308 U.S. 641 (1939).
23. ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., MEETING MINUTES 2-3
(Dec. 7, 1939), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Minutes/CV12-1939-min.pdf. At that meeting, other Committee members raised the concern
that such early amendment activity would make the Civil Rules seem unstable and thereby
undermine the efforts to get the states to follow them. Id. at 3.
24. Id.
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meddling by Congress. 25 In deference to the Chief Justice, and rec-
ognizing the value of staking an early claim to the task of supervis-
ing the Rules, the Advisory Committee proposed a discrete change
to make the Civil Rules applicable to compensation proceedings
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act.26 But it otherwise recommended that the Advisory Committee's
supervisory work be deferred to allow the case law to develop and to
give both bench and bar more time to study the Rules in action and
consider what changes might be needed.27 So ended that round of
rulemaking.
The Supreme Court called the members of the Advisory Commit-
tee back to duty two years later, in January 1942, expressly designat-
ing them ("or so many of them as are willing to serve") "as a
continuing Advisory Committee to advise the Court with respect to
proposed amendments or additions to the [Civil Rules] . ' '2 This
time, the Advisory Committee members were ready to undertake a
comprehensive review29 and ultimately proposed text amendments
(or new committee notes) to thirty-five rules, though not all of
them were approved by the Supreme Court. Now acting as a stand-
ing committee, the Advisory Committee continued to meet, spend-
ing the period between 1947 and 1951 developing what is now Rule
71.1 governing condemnation cases.30 In 1953, the Advisory
Committee once again undertook a comprehensive reexamination
of the Rules, an effort that culminated in 1955 in proposed amend-
ments to twenty-four of them.3 1 But the Supreme Court took no
action on the proposals and instead discharged the Advisory Com-
mittee one year later, in 1956.32
25. See id. at 4.
26. See id. at 18-21 (discussing the amendment and the reasons for advancing that pro-
posal); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, at 33 (describing the amendment).
27. See id. at 31-32.
28. Order Continuing the Advisory Committee, 314 U.S. 720, 720 (1942).
29. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
iii (1946) ("The time has arrived when the Court should consider amendments which experi-
ence may have shown to be desirable.").
30. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED RULE
TO GOVERN CONDEMNATION CASES IN THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1948);
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CML PROCEDURE, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF PROPOSED
RULE TO GOVERN CONDEMNATION CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1951).
31. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRIcr COURTS
(1955) [hereinafter 1955 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT].
32. See Order Discharging the Advisory Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956) (discharging
the Committee and revoking the 1942 Order constituting the Advisory Committee as a con-
tinuing body).
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The interregnum did not last long. In 1958, Congress passed leg-
islation giving the Judicial Conference the responsibility to "carry
on a continuous study of the operation and effect" of the Civil
Rules and to make recommendations for changes or additions to
those rules to be submitted to the Supreme Court. 33 In turn, the
Judicial Conference created the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure and five advisory committees, including an
advisory committee for the Civil Rules.34 Under the legendary
"Queen Mary Compromise," the appointments to the committees
would be made by the Chief Justice, a practice designed to give the
committees the stature and prestige of "Supreme Court Commit-
tees" even though they would be operating within the Judicial Con-
ference structure.35  That structure-in which the Advisory
Committees and the Standing Committee make recommendations
to the Judicial Conference, which then makes recommendations to
the Court-remains in place today.36
33. Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 331 (2006)). Interestingly, Clark had raised the possibility of integrating a standing
advisory committee into the Judicial Conference and Administrative Office structures as far
back as 1942. See Clark, Proper Function, supra note 17, at 525 (making the suggestion in part
because he envisioned that a standing advisory committee would also interact with other
rulemaking bodies in both the federal and state systems).
34. See Albert B. Mars, Federal Procedural Rule-Making: The Program of the Judicial Confer-
ence, 47 A.B.A. J. 772, 772, 773 (1961); see also WINIFRED BROWN, FEDERAL RuLEMAuNG:
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 5-8 (1981) (discussing the rulemaking structure created by the
Judicial Conference under the 1958 Act);JuDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 6-7 (1958) (setting
forth the Conference's approval).
35. See Tom C. Clark, Foreword to WIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, at xix; see also Sub-
committee on Long Range Planning, A Self-Study of FederalJudicial Rulemaking, 168 F.R.D.
679, 686 (1995) [hereinafter Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking] (discussing the
"Queen Mary Compromise"); Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking
Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 323, 328 (1991) (describing the "Queen Mary
Compromise").
36. See Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking, supra note 35, at 686 ("The rulemak-
ing process today follows the basic 1958 design."); Thomas F. Hogan, The Federal Rulemaking
Process: A Summary for the Bench and Bar, U.S. COURTS (Oct. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/
RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx; see also
Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1655, 1672-75 (1995)
(outlining the steps in the federal rulemaking process); Lee H. Rosenthal et al., They Were
Meant for Each Other: Professor Edward Cooper and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
495, 508-09 (2013) (noting that the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act did not
alter the basic rulemaking structure established in 1958); see generally 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)
(2006) (establishing procedures for the Judicial Conference rulemaking process).
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The 1956 discharge of the Advisory Committee presents a minor
mystery. The Supreme Court never said why it discharged the Com-
mittee. 7 Nor is it clear whether the Supreme Court had formulated
at that time any definite plans for a substitute process. 38 One thing
seems clear: the Court could have had no intention of doing the
necessary research and drafting work itself. The Court already felt
overwhelmed just by its duty of supervising the work of the Rules
Committees that reported to it. 39 It is equally clear that there was a
strong demand-both from the bar and, apparently, within the ju-
diciary itself-for the courts (and not Congress) to continue to
watch over the Rules and consider amendments. 40 The new scheme
thus seemed to meet everyone's concerns: the bar got the benefit of
an ongoing rulemaking process, the federal judiciary retained its
power over rulemaking, and the Supreme Court was relieved of the
burden of directly supervising the Rules Committees. 41
B. Keeping the Civil Rules Forever Young
Charles E. Clark was one of the most persistent and vocal propo-
nents of having a standing advisory committee. When addressing
the American Bar Association on the published draft of the Rules in
1936, he referred to the proposal for a standing advisory committee
(which appeared as Supplemental Rule A in that draft) as "perhaps
37. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1006, at 37; see also Coleman, supra note 17, at
277 & n.100 (speculating that the Court may have been reacting to a general tension caused
by negative public opinion towards the Court).
38. See Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. Am. JuD.
Soc. 250, 253 (1963) [hereinafter Clark, Role of the Supreme Court].
39. See Earl Warren, Statement of the Chief Justice, in The Rule-Making Function and
the Judicial Conference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117, 118.
40. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 11, § 1007, at 37 ("Whatever may have been the
reasons that led the Supreme Court to discharge the Advisory Committee in 1956, the need
for some continuing machinery to study the operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and to recommend amendments when needed was so obvious that there was strong
professional demand, expressed by the American Bar Association, the American Judicature
Society, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and other concerned groups, for the
establishment of some new machinery to replace the defunct Advisory Committee."); Stanley
Reed, Comment by Mr. Justice Reed, in The Rule-Making Function and the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117, 140 (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE REGULAR ANNUAL MEETING 35 (1956) regarding the im-
portance of continuing court committees to prevent legislative interference with the Rules).
41. For an argument that the loss of direct supervision has harmed the process, see
Friedenthal, supra note 17, at 677 ("The removal of the direct connection between the advi-
sory committees and the Court appears to have caused deterioration both in the product
presented by such committees for the Court's approval and in the level of supervision exer-
cised by the Court.").
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the most important rule of all, from the longer view." 42 Clark re-
peated his call for the appointment of a standing advisory commit-
tee at the time the Rules took effect.43 He continued to advocate
the benefits of a standing advisory committee throughout the 1940s
and 1950s, until the modern Judicial Conference Rules Committee
structure was finally created in 1960. 44
Why was Clark so insistent that a standing advisory committee
was needed? It certainly wasn't because Clark was hoping for a sec-
ond chance to persuade the Advisory Committee to adopt his views
on how to design a set of rules of procedure. Clark had already won
that battle hands down.45 Indeed, given how thoroughly and perva-
sively the original Rules tracked Clark's views, one might have ex-
pected Clark to play the cliched role of protective father and
declare the existing Rules to be a finished and perfect product not
to be tampered with. 46 In pushing for a continuing advisory com-
mittee, however, Clark was simply being true to his core beliefs
about both the role of procedure and the proper method of law
reform.
Clark's philosophy of procedure is well known but worth restat-
ing. A self-avowed legal realist,47 Clark famously described proce-
dure as the "handmaid" ofjustice. 48 Thejob of procedure was to get
the case to the merits as quickly and inexpensively as possible.49
42. Charles E. Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules-Change in Bar's Attitude
Towards Improved Procedure-What Particularly Interested the Lauyers, 22 A.B.A. J. 787, 789
(1936). At that time, Clark emphasized the need for an easy mechanism for correcting any
mistakes the Advisory Committee might make. See id. As discussed later, Clark actually envi-
sioned a quite different set of functions for a standing advisory committee. See infta notes
56-91 and accompanying text.
43. See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid ofJustice, 23 WAsH. U. L.Q. 297, 308 (1938) [here-
inafter Clark, Handmaid].
44. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 2-4.
46. According to one commentator, however, Clark did engage in protective behaviors
as ajudge; indeed his battles with several of his colleagues on the Second Circuit to preserve
the spirit and integrity of the scheme he had devised are legendary. See Smith, supra note 3, at
921-22.
47. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 451.
48. See Clark, Handmaid, supra note 43, at 297.
49. See Smith, supra note 3, at 916; Marcus, supra note 2, at 501 ("Clark often voiced a
normative preference as to the foundational purpose of procedural rules: they should facili-
tate the efficient and just resolution of cases on their substantive merits."). Charles A. Wright
and Harry M. Reasoner described Clark's procedural philosophy this way: "The rules must be
flexible tools which will permit the litigants ajust, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
their lawsuit, rather than a welter of moves in ajudicial game of chess." Wright and Reasoner,
supra note 4, at 5.
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Clark thought the best way of reaching the merits was to deem-
phasize the role of pleadings and instead rely on discovery,
summary judgment, and pretrial conferences. 50
Fundamentally, Clark wanted to minimize procedural line draw-
ing and empower judges. In his view, past procedural schemes had
impeded the efficient pursuit of merits-based justice because they
were formalistic, relying on abstract concepts and categorization to
determine fixed outcomes without regard to whether those out-
comes made any sense. Clark thought that trying to draw and then
enforce procedural lines was a waste of time and money, and worse
yet, one that often stood in the way of getting to the merits.51 For
the new Federal Rules, Clark envisioned a flexible scheme in which
the Rules stated functional goals and then relied on discretionary
application by judges. 52 Later in his career, Clark remarked that
"rules of procedure, if soundly prepared, are a liberating, rather
than a restrictive, influence."53 Clark's scheme would do just that,
giving trial judges power and discretion and then relying on their
wisdom and common sense.54
Clark's views on the need for and role of a standing advisory
committee are a natural extension of his philosophy of procedure. 55
Shortly after the Advisory Committee was reappointed as a standing
committee in 1942, Clark identified four functions of the reconsti-
tuted Advisory Committee.56 One function would be to correct any
drafting errors that might be exposed, though Clark thought these
would be few as errors were likely to get pointed out during the
public comment process. 57 The bulk of the Advisory Committee's
50. See Charles E. Clark, The Amended Federal Rules, 15 BROOK. L. Rav. 1, 8-9 (1949)
[hereinafter Clark, Amended Rules]; Charles E. Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform,
13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 144, 154-59 (1948) [hereinafter Clark, Influence of FederalReform].
51. See Subrin, Clark's Procedural Outlook, supra note 5, at 139-42.
52. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 484-87.
53. Charles E. Clark, Foreword, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 479, 482 (1956) [hereinafter Clark,
Foreword].
54. See Charles E. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 164 (1956)
(stating that the central purpose of pretrial is the "individualization of the case, so that it may
be separated for its own particular treatment from the vast grist of cases passing through our
courts"); Charles E. Clark, Pre-Trial Orders and Pre-Trial as a Part of Trial, 23 F.R.D. 506, 506
(1959); see generally Subrin, Clark's Procedural Outlook, supra note 5, at 148 ("Throughout his
career, Clark urged that the discretion of capable judges, not procedural rules and juries, are
[sic] what was ultimately needed to have the law fairly and expeditiously applied.").
55. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 504-05 ("In a sense, the Advisory Committee repre-
sented the institutionalization of a pragmatic approach to law reform that placed faith in a
method of investigation shepherded by experts as sufficient to ensure good results for
procedure.").
56. See Clark, Proper Function, supra note 17, at 522.
57. Id.
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efforts naturally would go toward the other three functions: clarify-
ing the policy choices the Advisory Committee had already made
when formulating the Rules, revisiting those policy choices as might
be needed in light of experience under the Rules, and considering
new matters outside the scope of the existing Rules. Each of those
functions reflects Clark's pragmatic and instrumental approach to
procedure.
Clark's philosophy of procedure manifests itself initially in the
fact that two of the functions he envisioned for a standing advisory
committee-revisiting the policy choices previously made and con-
sidering new matters-contemplate actual changes to the Rules.
Some might be surprised that Clark would invite scrutiny of the
correctness or completeness of the rules he had just molded.
Wouldn't that be tantamount to saying that his scheme was wrong?
But Clark didn't see it that way. In Clark's eyes, a procedural rule
was only as good as the results it yielded, measured by whether it
hindered or facilitated the process of getting to the merits quickly
and cheaply. If experience under the Rules showed that they were
hindering the goals of Rule 1 or that there was a better way of ad-
vancing those goals, then the Rules should change.5 8 Similarly, if
experience under the Rules exposed gaps in the scheme, and addi-
tional rules addressing those gaps would advance the goals of Rule
1, then the Advisory Committee should propose them. 59 We have
no reason to believe that Clark anticipated wholesale changes. He
was clearly proud of the 1938 Civil Rules and was convinced they
were at the forefront of procedural progress.60 But he was equally
58. See Clark, Handmaid, supra note 43, at 304 (stating that rules "should be changed as
soon as they are found by experience to be hampering. Even good rules may become a
nuisance when lawyers discover how to use them as instruments of delay."); see also Marcus,
supra note 2, at 503 ("[Clark] envisioned the Federal Rules as impermanent, with their con-
tent contingent upon their functional success and thus always susceptible to change when
their success, or lack thereof, in practice required it.").
59. The process of filling in gaps in the text of a rule included codifying helpful prac-
tices that had developed under the Rules. See Wright, supra note 15, at 537. One vivid meta-
phor for that practice is that of putting down sidewalks where the people have worn
footpaths.
60. Clark's pride and confidence in the Civil Rules were evident in his writings from the
time of their enactment until Clark's death. See, e.g., Clark, Influence of Federal Reform, supra
note 50, at 145 ("But even though my own enthusiasm for the rules may thus require some
discounting, the course of judicial and professional opinion and decision appears to demon-
strate the success of the reform so thoroughly that I think we may take it as accepted fact in
our further discussion of reasons and consequences."); Clark, Proper Function, supra note 17,
at 521 (asserting in 1942 that the Civil Rules were an "outstanding success" and had achieved
"universal acceptance as a vital part of our federal law"); Clark, Role of the Supreme Court, supra
note 38, at 254 ("Viewed in perspective the success of the federal system is nothing short of
phenomenal."); Clark, Two Decades, supra note 17, at 435 ("Two decades of lively experience
[VOL. 46:2
Rule 56 and Charles Clark's Fountain of Youth
adamant that nobody should conclude that "the job has been done
once and for all." 61
The final task Clark identified for a standing Advisory Committee
was to take steps to "clarify" the policy choices that were already a
part of the Civil Rules. This function is also very much an expres-
sion of Clark's philosophy of procedure, though some context is
required to see why. The starting point is to examine Clark's some-
what cynical view about what happens to procedural rules once they
are in the hands of judges.
From his first reflections on the rulemaking process to the end of
his career, Clark emphasized what he called the natural tendency of
procedural rules to harden with use. Despite his orientation as a
legal realist, Clark was an advocate of having rules of procedure (as
opposed to a completely unguided each-judge-makes-her-own-rules
free-for-all) because he thought they promoted both efficiency and
fairness.62 By creating a system of recurring processes, rules of pro-
cedure allow for the efficient processing of a large volume of cases
while simultaneously promoting both the fact and appearance of
equal treatment.63 But Clark viewed it as inevitable that practice
under the Rules would cause them to calcify as those recurring pro-
cess hardened over time into rote.64 As Clark put it, "[fit is the na-
ture of all procedure to harden and solidify, to become increasingly
'red tape.' ,,65
Clark perceived a second, rather different phenomenon that he
felt inevitably caused good rules to go bad. In Clark's view, many of
the judges of his era simply didn't take procedure seriously, which
led to two types of problems. First, Clark believed that even great
judges were prone to stumbling into fundamental mistakes when
they hadn't taken the time to develop a genuine understanding of
under the federal civil rules provide adequate perspective for both survey and prognosis. The
rules have been thoroughly tried and not found wanting.").
61. Clark, Proper Function, supra note 17, at 524; see also Charles E. Clark, Stability and
Change in Procedure, 17 VAND. L. REV. 257, 260 (1964) ("More has been done to improve the
administration of justice in the past twenty-five years than in all our previous history. But it
would be a mistake to believe the task ended. In truth, reform begets reform; the first steps
show others which must be taken.").
62. See Clark, Handmaid, supra note 43, at 299-300.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 300.
65. Charles E. Clark, "Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 241,
244 (1953) [hereinafter Clark, Clarifying Amendments]; see also Clark, Amended Rules, supra note
50, at 2 ("Court procedure, like all routine red tape, while quite necessary, does have an
inveterate tendency to petrify. One cannot continue to do the same tasks recurringly without
developing a routine."); Clark, Proper Function, supra note 17, at 524 ("[1]t is the tendency of
procedure, as it is of all things which must be done recurringly and with fairness to all in-
volved, to follow settled rules and with ever increasing rigidity as time goes on.").
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the Rules. 66 Second, and perhaps more problematic, was a phenom-
enon Clark called "procedural particularism." By this he meant the
tendency ofjudges to manufacture a limiting principle to do justice
in the case before them without thinking about how that principle
will affect the operation of the general rule in other contexts and
cases. 67 Although those newly devised limiting principles might con-
veniently terminate the cases at hand, once noticed by the bar they
morph into restrictive subrules destined to "plague judicial adminis-
tration" going forward. 68
Compounding these problems was what Clark called a Gresham's
Law of how procedural precedents become established.69 As Clark
saw it, when a judge concludes that an activity is permitted under a
discretionary rule, that conclusion typically would not be set out in
any detail in a published decision.70 But when a judge concludes
that an activity is not permitted, despite the flexible ambit of the rule,
the judge often feels the need to justify and explain the restriction,
oftentimes in a written opinion.71 Moreover, lawyers pay more at-
tention to decisions that create restrictions because they establish
pitfalls that must be known and avoided. 72 Over time, the case law
becomes dominated by the restrictive view, which gains promi-
nence simply by its higher visibility. 73 Eventually, Clark thought, the
restrictive view squeezes out the permissive one.7 4
66. See Clark, Influence of Federal Reform, supra note 50, at 163 (noting the tendency of
great judges to "stumble over some of the more trite problems [of pleading] which a deeper
appreciation would have enabled them to avoid").
67. See Charles E. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and
Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 493, 497-98 (1950) [hereinafter Clark, Special Problems]; cf Clark,
Handmaid, supra note 43, at 304 ("[A] brilliant court may show a general impatience with
procedural delays and faults only to make some of the strangest of procedural rulings, either
without appreciating their significance and how far they are departing from modem view-
points or in an endeavor to rid themselves of unattractive cases through an assumed procedu-
ral fault. But such omissions come back to plague us mightily.") (footnote omitted).
68. See Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 498.
69. See Clark, Amended Rules, supra note 50, at 2. Gresham's Law is an economic principle
stating that if two forms of currency have the same face value but have different commodity
values, people will keep the currency with the higher commodity value and spend the other.
See Gresham's Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/245850/Greshams-law (last visited Oct. 14, 2012). Over time, Gresham's Law
has become associated with the simplified proposition that "bad money drives out good." See
id.
70. See Clark, Amended Rules, supra note 50, at 2; Clark, Clarifying Amendments, supra note
65, at 245; Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 498;
71. See Clark, Two Decades, supra note 17, at 445.
72. See Clark, Amended Rules, supra note 50, at 2.
73. See Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 498.
74. See Clark, Clarifying Amendments, supra note 65, at 245. Later in his career, Clark
referred to this phenomenon as a "well-known fact." See Clark, Foreword, supra note 53, at 480.
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So as Clark saw it, one of the standing Advisory Committee's
most important functions would be to restore the Rules to their
original state. 75 As Clark put it, "[u] nless revivified, the modern new
procedure will soon become as hard and unyielding as the old sys-
tems to which reform was directed. ' 76 Thus, when the case law
started to tie judges' hands instead of empowering them-either
because of an error of understanding or an act of procedural partic-
ularism-the Advisory Committee would undo the damage. And
when restrictive subrules started to accumulate on the Rules like
barnacles on the hull of a ship, the Advisory Committee would
scrape them away. In short, Clark saw the standing Advisory Com-
mittee as essential to preserving the discretion and flexibility of ju-
dicial action that he had managed to inject into the new scheme.
I think it is fascinating to observe that Clark would have vested
the standing Advisory Committee with a range of tools for perform-
ing that function. Clark recognized, of course, that sometimes the
situation would call for a change to the rule text. But Clark envi-
sioned that, most of the time, the standing Advisory Committee
would leave the rule text as is and rely on other levers to restore
practice under the rule to its intended state. One of Clark's sugges-
tions, for example, was that the standing Advisory Committee issue
an annual report to the Supreme Court identifying any ill-advised
developments in the case law.77 Clark thought the reports would be
the best means of keeping the Rules clear of unwanted accretions
because regular published reports would retard the growth of the
barnacles before any scraping was needed. 78 And although the an-
nual reports would not have the force of law, Clark seemed confi-
dent of their persuasive power-having "such force as the
experience and considered judgment of the committee could
command. '79
Finally, we know from actual events that Clark thought it appro-
priate to issue new Committee Notes without changing the rule
75. See Wright, supra note 15, at 531 ("Probably the most important single function of a
continuing rules committee is removing glosses which courts have written onto the rules.")
(citing Clark's work).
76. Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 507.
77. See Clark, Proper Function, supra note 17, at 523.
78. See id.; see also Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 508 (stating that a standing
committee should make a regular report and "should not hesitate to point out how judicial
trends as to particular rules were developing"); Clark, Two Decades, supra note 17, at 445-46
(stating that annual reports criticizing bad case law would be more effective than "clarifying"
amendments because the reports can be issued faster).
79. Clark, Proper Function, supra note 17, at 523. Clark plainly thought that such force
would be powerful, since he anticipated that the reports would make frequent amendments
unnecessary. See id.
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text. A very notable example-one with modern resonance-was
the 1955 proposal to issue a new Committee Note to Rule 8(a) (2)
reaffirming the text while providing the new note "in answer to vari-
ous criticisms and suggestions for amendment which have been
presented to the Committee."80 As readers of this essay are likely to
know, current Judicial Conference policy speaks to proposals for
"rule changes" and Committee Notes that accompany those
changes.8 Currently, there is no overt mechanism for the issuance
of new Committee Notes separate from a rule change. 82
We are close to capping this tale, but before doing so I have one
more thread to introduce. No less than the original Advisory Com-
mittee, a standing Advisory Committee would need to have its own
philosophy of rule drafting. Clark had distinct views on that subject
too, which he set out in a 1950 symposium article in the Vanderbilt
Law Review. Clark began with the premise that rules of procedure
should be viewed as grants of power. 83 But he recognized that it is
not enough to just grant discretionary authority. As Clark put it, "it
turns out that telling a court it has power does not guarantee the
exercise of that power."84 In order for that grant to be deployed
effectively, four conditions must exist: (1) judges must better un-
derstand the rules that they are interpreting and applying, (2) the
rules must be stated in terms of the functions they are to perform
and not as abstract mandates, (3) the rules must guide judges in
how to apply them, and (4) there must be a standing Advisory Com-
mittee to continually examine and amend the rules.85
In the end, all four of Clark's "drafting" conditions are directed
at the same problem-maintaining the flexibility of the scheme. As
discussed earlier, judges who don't fully understand the rules too
readily get lulled into engrafting restrictive principles that then
harden into ill-advised restrictive subrules. 86 The second and third
80. 1955 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 18-19, 54-56 (discussing pro-
posals to add new explanatory Committee Notes to Rule 8(a) (2) and Rule 54(b)).
81. See 1 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY Poucy § 440.30.20, available at www.uscourts.gov/RulesAnd
Policies/rues/about-ruemaking/taws-prcedures-governing-work-rules/rues-committee-
procedures.aspx.
82. The lack of any mechanism to issue freestanding new Committee Notes explains why
the Advisory Committee cannot simply "fix" misguided case law by issuing new Committee
Notes disavowing that case law. It also explains proposals (usually made tongue-in-cheek) to
republish existing rule text as is to provide a platform for a new Committee Note. See, e.g.,
Edward H. Cooper, King Arthur Confronts TwIqy Pleading, 90 OR. L. REv. 955, 980 (2012)
(noting a "less reverent" possibility that Rule 8(a) (2) be republished with a new Committee
Note disavowing the plausibility standard).
83. See Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 493.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
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conditions relate to the difficulty of displacing old habits. Abstract
declarations (e.g., simply declaring that law and equity are merged)
have little effect if the rules where those concepts intersect (e.g.,
allocating cases to judge or jury trial) fail to implement the con-
cepts functionally.87 And rules that grant discretion without in-
structing judges about how to use them leave the judge grasping for
guidance. As Clark saw it, "[e]xperience . . . shows that without
some signposts the tribunals inevitably drop back into past prac-
tices."88 Finally, per the fourth condition, when the rules become
distorted by restrictive subrules or the reemergence of older and
disavowed norms, a continuing advisory committee must stand pre-
pared to sweep aside those accretions and return the Rules to their
pristine form.89
To recap, the 1938 Civil Rules were indeed, as Professor Stephen
Subrin famously put it, the conquest of equity procedure over com-
mon-law procedure.9 0 Abstract conceptual mandates and rigid for-
malisms were out. Empowerment, flexibility, functionalism, and
discretion were in. But Clark recognized that the system he
designed would need constant tending to maintain those qualities.
Judicially added barnacles would need to be removed to preserve
flexibility and discretion. Rules would need to be changed when
experience showed that they did not achieve the results intended.
New ideas had to be cultivated and adopted when new problems
emerged or when those new ideas offered superior solutions to fa-
miliar problems. The job was not "done once and for all" nor would
it ever be. Left untended, the Civil Rules would harden with age
and lose their vitality, eventually becoming the target of some fu-
ture reform.
Clark's answer to that problem was, of course, the creation of a
continuing rules committee.91 If the Civil Rules were to serve their
function of getting cases to the merits quickly and efficiently, if the
Civil Rules were to remain at the forefront of procedural progress,
they would need to "be continually changed and improved. '92 The
87. See Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 499-500; see also Clark, Amended Rules,
supra note 50, at 11 (calling for a procedural philosophy that eschews "abstract formulas" and
instead "defines appropriate objectives and then creates natural means for their
achievement").
88. Clark, Foreword, supra note 53, at 483.
89. See Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 507.
90. Subrin, How Equity Conquered, supra note 2.
91. See Clark, Amended Rules, supra note 50, at 2-3.
92. See Clark, Handmaid, supra note 43, at 304.
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role of the standing Advisory Committee was to "prevent[ ] the sys-
tem from ever growing old."93 For Clark, a standing Advisory Com-
mittee would provide the Civil Rules with a built-in fountain of
youth.
II. RULE 56 VISITS CLARK'S FOUNTAIN OF YOUTH
Rule 56 received a substantial overhaul in 2010. It was not the
first time that the Advisory Committee had revisited Rule 56-far
from it. On a relative basis, Rule 56 has been among the most active
areas for further attention by the rulemakers. 94 Prior to 2010, Rule
56 had been amended five times-in 1946, 1963, 1987, 2007, and
2009-with the 1946 and 1963 amendments being both substantive
and significant.95 In addition, there were two sets of major pro-
posed amendments that were forwarded by the Advisory Committee
that did not get approved. This occurred in 1955 and 1992.96 Come
to think of it, hardly a decade has gone by when Rule 56 did not
make it onto the Advisory Committee's agenda for some reason.
In this Essay, I want to look at the 2010 amendments to Rule 56
from a specific angle. I do not attempt here to provide a detailed
explanation of the 2010 amendments or to analyze them on the
merits. Rather, I will consider them through the lens of Clark's
rulemaking vision. Thus, having sketched in Part I Clark's views on
the function of a continuing rulemaking committee, my aim in this
Part is to discuss how the 2010 amendments to Rule 56 conform to
(or depart from) Clark's views about the role of a standing Advisory
Committee.
The discussion is organized around two themes. First, Clark be-
lieved that one of the most important functions-and perhaps the
essential function-of the continuing Advisory Committee was to
"revivif[y]" the Rules and prevent them "from ever growing old."97
93. See Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 508.
94. By way of contrast, consider Rule 8, which has not experienced a major substantive
amendment since it was enacted seventy-five years ago. At the other end of the spectrum
would probably be the rules governing case management and discovery, which have been
repeatedly amended in the last four decades in an ongoing battle to contain perceived
problems of cost and delay. See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the
Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 676-78 (2010) (discussing discovery and case management rule
amendments since the 1970s).
95. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note (2010) (chronicling the various rule
amendments).
96. See 1955 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 56-59; ADVISORY COMMITTEE
oN RULES ON CIVIL RULES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, 119-29 (1992).
97. See Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 507-08.
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Accordingly, this Part of the Essay looks at the 2010 amendments to
Rule 56 as a modern makeover designed to make the text of the
rule relevant and responsive to the needs of modern summaryjudg-
ment practice. Second, Clark's basic procedural philosophy was to
empowerjudges by writing rules that stated goals and functions and
provided useful guidance, but then left the decision to the judge's
case-by-case discretion. Following that theme, this Part then consid-
ers how the 2010 amendments to Rule 56 consistently implement
this theme of guided discretion.
A. Rejuvenating Rule 56
In 2010, Rule 56 was given a modern makeover. It was badly
needed, a fact the Advisory Committee discovered during the restyl-
ing of the Civil Rules. The Committee's task when restyling was to
take the existing rule content and translate it into modern lan-
guage.98 Restyling Rule 56 turned out to be a bit surreal. Much of
the text seemed starkly disconnected from summary-judgment prac-
tice as the practicing lawyers and judges (and even the academics!)
knew it. Some of the existing provisions were simply outdated and
out-of-step with modern summaryjudgment practice. 99 At the same
time, many important summary-judgment practices (e.g., motions
for partial summary judgment and the court's power to act sua
sponte) were not to be found in the rule text.100 Yet under the con-
straints of the Style Project, the Advisory Committee was forced to
restyle provisions no one used while keeping mum on the issues
important to practice but absent from the rule text. Accordingly,
the Advisory Committee flagged the need for content reform but
left it for another project and another day. 10'
The wait was short. The Advisory Committee started looking at a
potential Rule 56 project in October 2005.102 During the course of
98. See Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1761, 1761 (2004) (describing the Style Project as an effort "to translate present text
into clear language that does not change the meaning"); Mary Kay Kane, Professor Edward
Cooper: The Quintessential Reporter, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 631, 632 (2013) (explaining the
Style Project's objectives to ensure consistency among the language of rule amendments de-
veloped by various reporters, remove archaic usages, and clarify ambiguous text).
99. See Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall 43 AKRON L. REV. 1139, 1150 (2010) (dis-
cussing outdated provisions for hearings and the service of affidavits).
100. See id. at 1150-51.
101. See ADVISORY COMMIT-rEE ON CIVL RuLEs, MEETING MINUTES 38-39 (2004), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CRAC0404.pdf;
Gensler, supra note 99, at 1150.
102. See ADVIsORY COMMITTEE ON CML RuLEs, MEETING MINUTES 24-25 (2005), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CVI1-2005-min.pdf.
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the next three meetings, the Advisory Committee extensively dis-
cussed whether to undertake the Rule 56 Project and, if so, what its
scope should be. 103 Ultimately, the Committee decided to embark
on a project that was both limited and comprehensive. The Rule 56
Project was limited in that the Advisory Committee made a deliber-
ate choice early in the process not to alter the summary-judgment
standard. Experience from a prior effort to restate the summary-
judgment standard in 1992 provided two valuable lessons: first, that
translating summary-judgment concepts into clear and concise rule
text is no easy feat; and second, that any alteration of the existing
text would ignite controversy. 10 4 The Advisory Committee decided
there was no need to go down that road. The summary-judgment
standard simply was not the part of Rule 56 that needed fixing.
Conceptually, the operative phrases of "no genuine dispute of ma-
terial fact" and "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" are
sound.10 5 From beginning to end of the Rule 56 Project, the Advi-
sory Committee repeatedly emphasized that the summary-judgment
standard was not being changed. 10 6
Apart from the summary-judgment standard, everything else in
Rule 56 was on the table. The purpose of the Rule 56 Project was to
One of the main agenda items at this October 2005 meeting was to determine what, if any,
new projects the Advisory Committee might undertake. The Committee was in a position to
consider new projects because it had substantially completed its work on the e-discovery rules
(which at that time had been approved by the Judicial Conference and forwarded to the
Supreme Court), and there was a lull in work on the Style Project because the draft amend-
ments had been published for an extended comment period.
103. See ADvIsoRY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 3-4 (2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-2007-min.pdf;
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 37 (2006), available at http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV05-2006-min.pdf; ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MEETING MINUTES 24-25 (2005), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV1 1-2005-min.pdf.
104. See Gensler, supra note 99, at 1152; Lee H. Rosenthal, The Summaiy Judgment Changes
That Weren't, 43 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 471, 479 (2012).
105. Although there is no shortage of academic criticism of current summary-judgment
practice, the bulk of the criticism is directed not at the phrasing of the rule text but at claims
thatjudges-including the Supreme Court-are not applying the rule text faithfully. See, e.g.,
Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cogni-
tive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. Rrv. 837, 895-902 (2009) (discussing Scott v. Harris as an exam-
ple of "cognitive illiberalism" in which judges improperly intrude on the jury's fact finding
role by making improper conclusions about what inferences "reasonable jurors" could draw);
Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis,"
and Efficiency Clichs Eroding Our Day in Court and Juy Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
982, 1064-71 (2003) (discussing cases in which the judge assumed the role of fact finder).
But seeJeffrey w. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, Aggregate Effi-
ciency, and AcceptableJustice, 43 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 685 (2012) (arguing for a return to the
"scintilla" rule "either by express amendment or judicial consensus").
106. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 56 advisory committee's note (2010) ("The standard for granting
summary judgment remains unchanged."); ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CVIL RULES, REPORT TO
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improve the summary-judgment process and bring it up to date
with actual practice.107 The Advisory Committee formed a subcom-
mittee to take a hard look at every provision of Rule 56 and con-
sider any and all suggestions for new or improved provisions. The
only litmus test was whether the suggestion would improve practice
under the Rule.
In the end, the Rule that emerged combined the old and the
new. The basic concept of granting judgment before trial when a
preview of the available proof showed that the outcome was fixed as
a matter of law had not changed; that concept was preserved by
preserving the standard. And various existing practices that are
staples of the summary-judgment process (e.g., using affidavits to
present facts and the mechanism allowing the nonmoving party to
state that it needs more time to gather facts) remained in the Rule.
But the new Rule certainly looked different, having been reorga-
nized to present the contents in a more logical sequence. And
many new provisions had been added, including the following:
" New language specifically authorizing motions for partial
summary judgment;108
" New language suggesting that courts state the reasons for
their decisions;10 9
" Detailed instructions on supporting assertions of fact;10
" A mechanism for parties to object that another party is rely-
ing on materials that cannot be presented in an inadmissible
form;"' t
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 21 (2008) ("From the begin-
ning, the Committee has been determined that no change should be attempted in the sum-
mary-judgment standard or in the assignment of burdens between movant and
nonmovant.").
107. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56 advisory committee's note (2010) ("Rule 56 is revised to im-
prove the procedures for presenting and deciding summary-judgment motions and to make
the procedures more consistent with those already used in many courts.").
108. FED. R. CIrv. P. 56(a). The 2010 amendments also made clear that parties could seek
"summary judgment" on particular issues even if the resolution of those issues would not
dispose of any claim or defense. See STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVL PROCEDURE:
RULES AND COMMENTARY 1027-28 (2012).
109. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(a).
110. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c)(1).
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The purpose of this new provision was to displace motions
to strike the allegedly improper materials. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note
(2010) ("There is no need to make a separate motion to strike."). But old habits are hard to
break; lawyers are still filing motions to strike, and judges are still granting them. See 11 JAMES
W. MooRE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE § 56.91[4] (3d ed. 2011 & Supp. 2012).
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* A new provision directly establishing the principle that
judges need not scour the summaryjudgment record look-
ing for proof not offered by a party-a provision affection-
ately called the "antiferret rule";' 12
* New provisions addressing the consequences of a party's
failure to properly support its own factual assertions or,
more commonly, to properly oppose the other side's factual
assertions;' 1 3 and
* New provisions addressing the court's power to act sua
sponte. 1 14
None of these changes to Rule 56 speak to the "high theory" of
summary judgment. But they all fit squarely within Clark's model of
continuing rulemaking. Each change addresses a practical issue
that is relevant on a day-to-day basis to the work of lawyers and
judges. Moreover, the importance of each topic flows not from its
value as an abstract concept but from evaluating where guidance
was needed based on actual experience under the Rule. Each
change is designed, in its own way, to promote the utility of the
Rule by clarifying its functions and providing guidance for its effec-
tive use. The 2010 Amendments are unapologetically pragmatic. To
use Clark's term, they "revivify" the Rule by reconnecting the text
with modern practice. Clark surely would have approved.
B. Guided Discretion
Perhaps the most Clarkian aspect of the 2010 amendments is the
degree to which they empower judges with guided discretion. In-
deed, every new or expanded provision places one or more matters
within the discretion of the judge and-in either the text or the
Committee Note-provides guidance about the exercise of that
discretion.
Let me start by emphasizing that I am not referring to the ques-
tion whether judges have discretion to deny a summary-judgment
motion even when the requirements for granting summary judg-
ment have been met. As I have chronicled elsewhere, that question
was flagged for comment during the public comment period and
received considerable attention during the rulemaking process.?15
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see Rosenthal, supra note 104, at 488 (describing the provi-
sion as "relieving judges of the obligation to behave like ferrets or truffle pigs").
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
114. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(0.
115. See Gensler, supra note 99, at 1150.
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For present purposes, it is enough to note that the Advisory
Committee very openly and explicitly elected not to address that
question during the Rule 56 Project, largely on the grounds that it
was too tied up with the summary-judgment standard (which the
Advisory Committee had already decided not to revisit)." 6
Rather, the discretionary powers I'm referring to concern the
court's power to shape the process by which summary-judgment mo-
tions are made, supported, opposed, and resolved. Rule 56(a), for
example, provides that judges "should state on the record the rea-
sons for granting or denying the motion."1"7 But the absence of a
mandatory "must" is unmistakable, and the accompanying Commit-
tee Note explains that "[t]he form and detail of the statement of
reasons are left to the court's discretion."1 18 Moreover, the Commit-
tee Note very clearly explains the function served by a statement of
reasons so that judges can determine what kind of statement, if any,
is needed under the circumstances.' 19
Rule 56(c) contains two important examples of guided discre-
tion. Subsection (c) (2) is nominally addressed to the parties in that
it provides a mechanism for raising objections to the admissibility of
another party's summary-judgment materials. But as the Committee
Note makes clear, the function of this provision is to align the sum-
mary-judgment proof with the anticipated proof at trial so that the
judge can properly determine whether a trial is needed. 120 The
Note explains that "[t]he objection functions much as an objection
at trial, adjusted for the pretrial setting."'12 If a proof could not be
considered at trial (e.g., because it is inadmissible hearsay subject to
no possible exception) then it can have no bearing on whether
there is enough proof to send the matter to a jury. But neither the
text nor the Note establishes any rigid requirement that all sum-
mary-judgment proofs must be reduced to an admissible form at
the time the motion is made or opposed. Rather, the Rule creates a
framework for raising the issue-and the Committee Note explains
what is at issue-but it is up to the judge to determine whether,
under the circumstances, to accept proof that is currently not in an
admissible form upon an explanation of the admissible form that is
116. See id. at 1159; Rosenthal, supra note 104, at 487-88. In a forthcoming article, I take
the position that judges do and should have a limited discretion to deny properly supported
summary-judgment motions. See Steven S. Gensler, Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment:
Can Judges Just Say No? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
117. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(a) (emphasis added).
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anticipated. In a similar vein, subsection (c) (3) endows judges with
discretion to consider proof that is in the summary-judgment re-
cord but that has not been called to the judge's attention by any
party.122 Although it is fair to put the burden on the parties to take
responsibility for marshaling their proofs, there are times when it
would smack of formalism for a judge who already knew of critical
proof in the record to ignore it because the party forgot to cite to it
in the papers. Subdivision (c) (3) sensibly leaves it to the judge to
make that determination on a case-by-case basis.
Rule 56(e) tackles the question of what to do with unopposed
motions. The case law from most circuits had held that judges
could not grant summary judgment solely because a motion was
unopposed, but instead had to determine whether the motion was
at least supported on its face. 123 Many districts had adopted so-
called "deemed admitted" rules, in which any fact assertions not
opposed were deemed admitted for purposes of determining
whether the requirements for summary judgment had been met.1 24
During the rulemaking process, some argued that the rule should
explicitly provide that an unopposed motion should be treated as
having been confessed. The Advisory Committee ultimately re-
jected that view, believing that a party seeking a pretrial judgment
should have to make at least some showing of entitlement.125 More-
over, the Advisory Committee was wary of a strict rule of forfeiture
given that sometimes the deficiency in the response might be un-
derstandable, if not excusable. In short, there is no one-size-fits-all
answer about what to do when a party fails to properly oppose a
summary-judgment motion. In that spirit, the Rule provides the
court with options and then provides guidance in the accompany-
ing Committee Note regarding the factors that might be relevant to
the judge's choice. 126
122. FED. R. Cr. P. 56(c)(3).
123. See, e.g., Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008); Vermont Teddy
Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004); Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d
1.190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002); NEPSK, Inc. v. Town of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2002).
124. At the Advisory Committee's request, two of the staff attorneys in the Rules Support
Office surveyed the local district court rules to determine, among other things, how many
had "deemed admitted" provisions. The survey identified these provisions in twenty districts.
See Memorandum from Jeffrey Barr & James Ishida to Judge Michael Baylson, Survey of Dis-
trict Court Local Summary Judgment Rules 1-3 (Mar. 21, 2007), in ADVISORY COMMrrrEE ON
CRIL RuLEs, AGENDA (2007) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies
/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2007-04.pdf.
125. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 56 advisory committee's note (2010) ("As explained below, sum-
mary judgment cannot be granted by default even if there is a complete failure to respond to
the motion . . ").
126. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 56(e) & advisory committee's note (2010).
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Finally, Rule 56(f) now provides explicit authority for the court
to act sua sponte upon giving the affected party notice and a rea-
sonable opportunity to respond. 27 The purpose of the new provi-
sion was to codify powers that the courts had already claimed under
the prior rule. 128 But the court's newly codified power is explicitly
discretionary. 29 This is not an area where absolutes exist nor is it an
area where all of the relevant considerations could be reduced to
concise rule text. The rule empowers but leaves its application flexi-
ble and subject to the common-sense application of judges.
I think all of the changes discussed above reflect a very Clarkian
emphasis on empowerment, flexibility, and discretion. But the story
continues with a change that, in hindsight, might have had Clark
rolling in his grave had it gone through. I'm referring to the propo-
sal to embed the so-called "point-counterpoint" motion and brief-
ing process into Rule 56. As readers may recall, the Advisory
Committee included a point-counterpoint scheme in the proposed
amendments published for comment in 2008.130 Modeled after lo-
cal briefing rules used in many districts, the proposal required mov-
ing parties to state their assertions of fact in separate paragraphs
(the "point") and then required opposing parties to state their
acceptance or opposition of each assertion in correspondingly
numbered paragraphs (the "counterpoint"). The goal of this type
of scheme was to ensure that the parties' papers actually speak to
each other, instead of seeming like ships passing in the night.
The 2008 proposal would have created a default provision, not a
mandate. 31 Individual judges could have opted out in any case. In-
deed, nothing would have prevented a judge from opting out in
every case. Nonetheless, the proposal drew heavy criticism from
127. FED. R. Ctv. P. 56(f). The rule identifies three types of sua sponte action: (1) grant-
ing summary judgment for the nonmoving party, (2) granting a motion on grounds not
raised by the moving party, and (3) raising the question of summary judgment on the court's
own initiative. Id.
128. See FED. R. Cwr. P. 56 advisory committee's note (2010) ("Subdivision (f) brings into
Rule 56 text a number of related procedures that have grown up in practice.").
129. See FED. R. Cw. P. 56(f) (stating the court "may" take the actions listed).
130. See REPORT OF THE ADVIsORY COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RuLs OF CML PROCEDURE TO
THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RuLEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 65-70 (2008) [hereinafter
MAY 2008 REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RuesAndPolicies/rules/
Reports/CV06-2008.pdf; see also Rosenthal, supra note 104, at 489 (describing the point-coun-
terpoint proposal). For the text of the proposal, see Rosenthal et al., supra note 36, at 521-22
n.102.
131. Proposed Rule 56(c)(1) stated, "The procedures in this subdivision (c) apply unless
the court orders otherwise in the case." MAY 2008 REPORT, supra note 130, at 66.
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many, including critics from both bench and bar.1 - 2 The most re-
curring objections were that the point-counterpoint scheme skews
outcomes by creating a sterile, sliced-and-diced version of the
events and that it increases the cost and complexity of the motion
process. 133
After reviewing the written comments and listening to the live
testimony offered at three hearings, the Advisory Committee
elected not to proceed with the point-counterpoint proposal. 134 Al-
though one of the main goals of the proposal had been to achieve
national uniformity, motion and briefing practices are not the type
of aspects of practice that absolutely must be the same in every dis-
trict.13 5 In other words, the value of national uniformity would de-
pend on getting the model right. And in the end, the Advisory
Committee was not convinced that point-counterpoint was the only
or the best methodology. Judges and districts would continue to be
free to choose to follow it. But the case had not been made for
enshrining point-counterpoint into the national rule, even on a de-
fault basis.
I think Clark would have approved of both the process and the
result. First, the process of listening to feedback from lawyers and
judges who had experience with similar rules was very much in the
Clark tradition. Clark was an early advocate of empirical research. 1
36
He also believed in procedural experimentation. 13 7 What mattered
most to Clark was figuring out what works. The Advisory Committee
backed off the point-counterpoint proposal because feedback from
districts around the country that had experimented with similar
schemes suggested that they did not always work as intended. Sec-
ond, the point-counterpoint provision would have been inconsis-
tent with Clark's primary values of empowerment and flexibility.
Clark wanted rules that liberated judges to do what made sense
under the circumstances. The point-counterpoint scheme would
132. See Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36
OWt.A. Ci-r U. L. REv. 231, 247-48 (2011) (discussing judicial opposition); see also Rosenthal
et al., supra note 36, at 522-23 (discussing opposition to the point-counterpoint proposal).
133. See Rosenthal, supra note 104, at 491-93.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 494 (discussing reasons for adopting national rules and why the point-
counterpoint proposal did not satisfy those criteria).
136. See Carl Baar & Steven Flanders, False Start? Charles Clark and the Quantitative Study of
Judicial Administration, in JUnGe CHARLEs EDWARD CLARK 1 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991)
(describing and analyzing Clark's empirical work).
137. See Clark, Clarifying Amendments, supra note 65, at 251 (supporting state adaptations
to the Civil Rules and noting that state innovations may lead the way toward future federal
amendments).
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have created an exoskeleton that, even as a default provision, invari-
ably would have led to less flexibility in the summary-judgment
process.
I confess that I was among the members of the Advisory Commit-
tee that started out supporting the proposal. I changed my mind
after listening to the witnesses at the hearings and reviewing the
written comments. I still think that the point-counterpoint scheme
is a valuable tool. If I were a district court judge, I expect that I
would use it from time to time-when it was the right tool for the
job. But adopting set motion and briefing practices will not solve
the problems of unnecessary cost and delay in summary-judgment
practice. Those problems are not the result of too much flexibility
or too little fixed process. Continued reflection has led me to quite
the opposite conclusion. The biggest problem with summary-judg-
ment practice is that it has become too routinized.138 I now believe
that the key to a more effective and efficient summary-judgment
practice lies in having the judge tailor the process to the needs of
each case.139
III. BACK TO ED
Because this Symposium commemorates Ed Cooper's service to
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, I want to close with a few com-
ments related to rulemaking, the 2010 Rule 56 amendments, and
Ed. I will not attempt to set forth a Cooperian philosophy of
rulemaking. Though I suspect such a thing exists, it is not my place
to explicate it, even if I thought I could do it justice. Nor will I
attempt to link Ed with any particular provisions of the 2010 Rule
56 amendments. I do not need to tell anyone who follows the Advi-
sory Committee's work how powerful Ed's voice is in the rulemak-
ing process. But above all it remains a process populated by many
voices. I am sure Ed would want neither the credit nor the blame
for the Advisory Committee's collective work. Rather, I will limit
myself to two related observations about Ed that have to do with
writing rules that give judges discretion.
Academics continue to debate the role of discretion in the rules
of procedure. 140 The Civil Rules are often criticized for relying too
138. See Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summaiy Judgment, 43 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 517, 555 (2012).
139. Id. at 520-21.
140. See Gensler, supra note 94, at 720-26 (canvassing the debate).
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heavily on judicial discretion. Some commentators worry that dis-
cretion gives judges too much power.1 41 The fear is that judges will
abuse that power, and that the lack of clear standards makes the
abuses effectively unreviewable. Other commentators have argued
that relying on discretion allows the Advisory Committee to perpet-
uate the fiction of "trans-substantive" rules.1 42 These critics argue
that the Advisory Committee could not continue to have a single set
of rules for all cases if the rules themselves had to acknowledge and
incorporate the de facto differences in procedure that different
types of cases get from the exercise ofjudicial discretion. 143 Another
commentator has argued that the Committee uses discretion as a
crutch to duck making difficult decisions. 44
Not everyone is so wary or skeptical of judicial discretion. Profes-
sor Richard L. Marcus (currently the Co-Reporter for the Advisory
Committee) has described his "guarded optimism" about the trend
toward increased procedural discretion. 145 Addressing the amend-
ments to Rule 16, Professor David Shapiro praised the choice to
give judges significant discretion in how to manage their cases, not-
ing that "cases do vary in ways that are difficult to spell out in
advance."'46 In his seminal analysis of procedural discretion, Profes-
sor Maurice Rosenberg distinguished between good reasons and
bad reasons for giving trial judges discretion. 47 Bad reasons include
trying to make judges happy and blindly pursuing efficiency or
141. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 380 (1982); Jay
Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 513, 531 (2006).
142. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules
and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1988) ("Federal Rules that avoid policy
choices and that in essence chart ad hoc decision-making by trial judges are uniform and
hence trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense."); Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts
Revisited: The Proliferation ofAd Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2131, 2176 (1989) ("[B]y and
large the erosion of trans-substantive rules has come via ad hoc informal, customized proce-
dures devised by judges ....").
143. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, Diver-
gence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2048 (1989) ("When one
begins to define procedures more rigorously, it becomes obvious that some cases need differ-
ent rules.").
144. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CaRDozo L.
REv. 1961, 1974 (2007) ("[D]elegating discretion allows rulemakers to dodge difficult and
controversial normative choices by handing them to trial judges in individual cases, where
they are less transparent and less likely to trigger public debate.").
145. See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1561,
1605-15 (2003) (noting that the bar generally favors discretion, instances of real abuse seem
rare, and the alternatives are likely worse).
146. David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137
U. PA. L. REv. 1969, 1995 (1989).
147. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRA-
CUSE L. Rav, 635, 660-65 (1971).
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finality. 148 In contrast, a good reason exists where the subject can-
not be helpfully reduced to more particularized guidance. Chiefly,
Rosenberg was thinking of circumstances where it would be imprac-
ticable-if not impossible-to anticipate and address all of the
situations that might arise under the rule.149
I would characterize Ed Cooper's views on discretion-at least
those he has shared with the public in his writings-as moderate
and practical. One might even call them Rosenbergian. Reflecting
on discretion, Ed once wrote:
Discretion is a useful rulemaking technique when it is difficult
-as it almost always is-to foresee even the most important
problems and to determine their wise resolution. Reliance on
discretion is vindicated only when district judges and magis-
trate judges use it wisely most of the time and in most cases.
The ongoing revisions of the Civil Rules time and again reflect
an implicit judgment that confidence is well placed in the dis-
cretionary exercise of power by federal trial judges. 150
As discussed above, there is a powerful pro-discretion theme in
the 2010 amendments to Rule 56. Time and again, the Advisory
Committee chose to create frameworks that addressed practical is-
sues that come up often, identified the interests at stake, and pro-
vided options and guidance, but then left the solution in any
particular case to the district judge's discretion. I think I can safely
say-without stitching a scarlet "D" onto his frock-that Ed played
a significant role in the Advisory Committee's decision to opt for
these discretionary frameworks. In my mind, I can see and hear Ed
regularly reminding us that so many of the practical questions that
come up in summary-judgment administration defy easy categorical
answers. A rigid subrule that might make sense in one scenario
might lead to unfairness or inefficiency in another. Any effort to
cover all the possible factors and outcomes would lead to a bramble
of rule text turning on ever-finer distinctions. Wouldn't it be better
to sketch out the contours of the problem and let the judge find
the best solution in light of the particulars of the case?
That brings me to my second, and related, point. If anyone on
the planet could write a rule that really did incorporate all of the
potential variables, it would be Ed. And if anyone on the planet
148. See id. at 660-62.
149. See id. at 662-63.
150. Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1794, 1795
(2002).
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could then identify the correct outcomes for all of those combina-
tions, it would be Ed. All of us who have been privileged to serve on
the Advisory Committee (or wise enough to attend one or more of
the meetings, which are open to the public' 51) have had the singu-
lar pleasure of hearing Ed recite without notes or rehearsal a de-
tailed history of a procedural issue that we weren't even aware
existed-and then tie it into a savvy discussion of the pros and cons
of some choice the Committee had to make. Trust me: nobody
knows this stuff better than Ed.
But I think Ed would be absolutely horrified by the thought of
writing a rule that attempted to incorporate all of the variables and
then prescribed outcomes for each combination. In part, I think Ed
would abhor any rule that tried to operate on such a granular level.
So much for simple structure and elegant drafting! But mostly I
think the reason goes back to the passage of Ed's that I quoted
above: "Discretion is a useful rulemaking technique when it is difficult-as
it almost always is-to foresee even the most important problems and to de-
termine their wise resolution." Ed knows more about the Civil Rules
than anyone, but you will never hear him claim to have all the an-
swers or to be infallible. The 2010 amendments to Rule 56 leave a
lot to the judge's discretion to account for all of the circumstances
that rules-and even the best of rulemakers and the very best of
Reporters-cannot foresee or wisely resolve in advance.
My final comment ties us back to the man who first held Ed's
position, Charles E. Clark. When writing about the conditions
needed for quality rule drafting, Clark could not help but mention
the importance of having quality drafters. 52 He wanted experts of
course. But he cautioned against the expert who, like Stephen, the
drafter of the Hilary Rules of 1834, thought it his duty to enshrine
the entirety of his knowledge into the text.153 Clark then described
his ideal rule drafter this way: "The conclusion is therefore that we
need for the task skilled technicians not only with complete knowl-
edge of their subject, but also with the poise and common sense to
keep their technical knowledge from warping the result."154 I don't
know where Ed was in 1950 when Clark wrote that, but Ed, he was
talking about you.
151. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1) (2006) ("Each meeting for the transaction of business
under this chapter by any committee appointed under this section shall be open to the pub-
lic, except when the committee so meeting, in open session and with a majority present,
determines that is in the public interest that all or part of the remainder of the meeting on
that day shall be closed to the public, and states the reason for so closing the meeting.").
152. See Clark, Special Problems, supra note 67, at 499.
153. See id.
154. Id.
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